TY - GEN
T1 - A bound on attacks on authentication protocols
AU - Stoller, Scott D.
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - Authentication protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent executions of the protocol. This paper establishes a bound on the number of protocol executions that could be useful in attacks. The bound applies to a large class of protocols, which contains versions of some well-known authentication protocols, including the Yahalom, Otway-Rees, and Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocols.
AB - Authentication protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent executions of the protocol. This paper establishes a bound on the number of protocol executions that could be useful in attacks. The bound applies to a large class of protocols, which contains versions of some well-known authentication protocols, including the Yahalom, Otway-Rees, and Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocols.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84891081669
U2 - 10.1007/978-0-387-35608-2_48
DO - 10.1007/978-0-387-35608-2_48
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84891081669
SN - 9781475752755
T3 - IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology
SP - 588
EP - 600
BT - Foundations of Information Technology in the Era of Network and Mobile Computing - IFIP 17th World Computer Congress - TC1 Stream / 2nd IFIP Int. Conference on Theoretical Computer Science (TCS 2002)
PB - Springer New York LLC
T2 - IFIP 17th World Computer Congress - TC1 Stream / 2nd IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science, TCS 2002
Y2 - 25 August 2002 through 30 August 2002
ER -