A bound on attacks on payment protocols

S. D. Stoller

A bound on attacks on payment protocols

S. D. Stoller

Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Electronic payment protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent instances of the protocol. This paper establishes an upper bound on the number of protocol instances needed to attack a large class of protocols, which contains versions of some well-known electronic payment protocols, including SET and 1KP. Such bounds clarify the nature of attacks on and provide a rigorous basis for automated verification of payment protocols.

Original language	English
Pages	61-70
Number of pages	10
State	Published - 2001
Event	16th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science - Boston, MA, United States Duration: Jun 16 2001 → Jun 19 2001

Conference

Conference	16th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Country/Territory	United States
City	Boston, MA
Period	06/16/01 → 06/19/01

Cite this

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abstract = "Electronic payment protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent instances of the protocol. This paper establishes an upper bound on the number of protocol instances needed to attack a large class of protocols, which contains versions of some well-known electronic payment protocols, including SET and 1KP. Such bounds clarify the nature of attacks on and provide a rigorous basis for automated verification of payment protocols.",

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AB - Electronic payment protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent instances of the protocol. This paper establishes an upper bound on the number of protocol instances needed to attack a large class of protocols, which contains versions of some well-known electronic payment protocols, including SET and 1KP. Such bounds clarify the nature of attacks on and provide a rigorous basis for automated verification of payment protocols.

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T2 - 16th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science

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A bound on attacks on payment protocols

Abstract

Conference

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