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An incentive compatible market mechanism for integrating demand response into power systems

  • Stony Brook University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a market mechanism that allows demand response providers (DRPs) to participate in a two-settlement electricity market as power suppliers alongside conventional generators. Each DRP bids her demand reduction capacity and cost rate, and the independent system operator (ISO) schedules the power dispatch to minimize the overall system cost. We show that, with the proposed mechanism, truthful bidding by the DRPs is achieved at a Nash equilibrium (NE), and as a result, the social welfare is maximized. The theoretical results are corroborated by simulation studies.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781728161273
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 11 2020
Event2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020 - Tempe, United States
Duration: Nov 11 2020Nov 13 2020

Publication series

Name2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020

Conference

Conference2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityTempe
Period11/11/2011/13/20

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