TY - GEN
T1 - Automatic generation of buffer overflow attack signatures
T2 - 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2005
AU - Liang, Zhenkai
AU - Sekar, R.
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - Buffer overflows have become the most common target for network-based attacks. They are also the primary mechanism used by worms and other forms of automated attacks. Although many techniques have been developed to prevent server compromises due to buffer overflows, these defenses still lead to server crashes. When attacks occur repeatedly, as is common with automated attacks, these protection mechanisms lead to repeated restarts of the victim application, rendering its service unavailable. To overcome this problem, we develop a new approach that can learn the characteristics of a particular attack, and filter out future instances of the same attack or its variants. By doing so, our approach significantly increases the availability of servers subjected to repeated attacks. The approach is fully automatic, does not require source code, and has low run-time overheads. In our experiments, it was effective against most attacks, and did not produce any false positives.
AB - Buffer overflows have become the most common target for network-based attacks. They are also the primary mechanism used by worms and other forms of automated attacks. Although many techniques have been developed to prevent server compromises due to buffer overflows, these defenses still lead to server crashes. When attacks occur repeatedly, as is common with automated attacks, these protection mechanisms lead to repeated restarts of the victim application, rendering its service unavailable. To overcome this problem, we develop a new approach that can learn the characteristics of a particular attack, and filter out future instances of the same attack or its variants. By doing so, our approach significantly increases the availability of servers subjected to repeated attacks. The approach is fully automatic, does not require source code, and has low run-time overheads. In our experiments, it was effective against most attacks, and did not produce any false positives.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/33846294027
U2 - 10.1109/CSAC.2005.12
DO - 10.1109/CSAC.2005.12
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:33846294027
SN - 0769524613
SN - 9780769524610
T3 - Proceedings - Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC
SP - 215
EP - 224
BT - Proceedings - 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2005
Y2 - 5 December 2005 through 9 December 2005
ER -