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Competitive Market with Renewable Power Producers Achieves Asymptotic Social Efficiency

  • Stony Brook University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

A price-making two-settlement power market in which both conventional generators and renewable power producers (RPPs) participate is studied. It is proved that the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the market converges to the social optimum as the number of RPPs increases. As a result, social efficiency is asymptotically achieved with a simple market mechanism for integrating RPPs, without the need for an independent system operator (ISO) to perform a centralized stochastic optimization. The analytical derivation of the NE offers an elegant charac-terization of the market power of the competitive RPPs. The market outcomes predicted by the developed theoretical results are demonstrated by simulation studies.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2018
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
ISBN (Electronic)9781538677032
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 21 2018
Event2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2018 - Portland, United States
Duration: Aug 5 2018Aug 10 2018

Publication series

NameIEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
Volume2018-August
ISSN (Print)1944-9925
ISSN (Electronic)1944-9933

Conference

Conference2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPortland
Period08/5/1808/10/18

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