Corrigendum to “common knowledge, coordination, and the logic of self-conscious emotions” [Evolution and Human Behavior volume 39, issue 2, march 2018, pages 179–190](S1090513816303415)(10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.12.001)

The authors regret that the below abstract was missed in the article. When people know they have committed a social transgression, they often feel negative self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment, shame, or guilt. Previous research shows that these emotions are intensified by an audience. Intuition suggests they are further intensified when the actor acknowledges the transgression to the audience. We test this intuition and explain it using the game-theoretic distinction between shared knowledge (A and B each know something)and common knowledge (A knows that B knows that A knows that B knows… ad infinitum). In one experiment, participants reported their emotions in hypothetical embarrassing situations; in another, they reported their emotions in an actual embarrassing situation, a karaoke performance for a panel of judges. Self-conscious emotions were more intense when the transgression was common knowledge than when it was shared knowledge. Other negative emotions (sadness, anger, and fear)did not show this effect. These findings reveal that self-conscious emotions are governed not only by the presence of an audience but also by the actor's level of knowledge. We propose that the function of self-conscious emotions is to implement strategies in a coordination game in which players negotiate which type of relationship (and ensuing social obligations)bind them together, to their mutual benefit. These emotions confirm common knowledge of these obligations in spite of a one-time or accidental breach, thereby ratifying that the relationship is still in force. The authors would like to apologise for any inconvenience caused.