Abstract
We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium (WE) directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley-Shubik trading-post game.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 391-400 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue number | 5-6 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 2003 |
Keywords
- Nash equilibria
- Trading-post
- Walras equilibria
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