Immigration policy as counterterrorism: The effects of security on migration and border control in the European union

Although the political aims of terrorism are government concessions that will further a cause (Friedland and Merari 1985; Long 1990), its psychological effects of fear and anxiety (Crenshaw 1986) often produce unintended consequences. Ironically, the jihadist terrorist charges against Western liberal societies provoked those societies to adopt counterterrorist policy responses that undermined some of their own most fundamental democratic norms. Nowhere is this more evident than with regard to the politics of immigration and immigrant control in Europe. Reverberating well beyond the borders of the United States, sweeping counterterrorist responses have extended to the politics of migration. The broad spectrum of policies that have emerged on national defense and homeland security in response to the horrific events of September 11 focuses not only on efforts to develop sensors to detect explosives and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but also on policies toward foreigners, domestic insurgents, and travelers. The role of foreigners and foreign networks in the 9/11 terror plots and, particularly, in those carried out in Madrid and London later stoked national security debates and sanctioned the use of immigration policy as a tool in counterterrorism. Acting with unprecedented speed, the European Council met in an extraordinary session on September 20-21, 2001, and adopted a detailed and ambitious plan of action to combat terrorism, based on a "coordinated and comprehensive approach."1 The following day, the presidency convened a meeting with the ambassadors of the then-candidate countries. They agreed unanimously to align themselves with the action plan, adopting law enforcement and judicial measures for cooperation against terrorism (see alignment of candidate-countries with conclusions, European Council).2 Their American counterparts gave more teeth to the new strategy of comprehensiveness when top foreign officials outlined their visions for migration and border control. At a closed meeting of the European Union (EU) Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers, and Asylum on October 26, 2001, the head of the American delegation told EU member-state representatives that, "since the events of 11 September 2001, the whole system of visas, border control, management of legal migration, etc, had come under close scrutiny." He expressed "a need for a more effective system across the board, not targeted specifically at terrorism but taking the events of 11 September as the trigger for developing a new approach." The U.S. official also enumerated a set of demands that the U.S. administration intended to impose on European governments and companies.3 The calls for international cooperation and coordination of police, law enforcement, and border controls underscored the ascendancy of migration regulation in the development of "a new and comprehensive" security framework. As demands for transatlantic cooperation in the "war on terror" and in law enforcement became paramount, the link between migration and counterterrorism gathered steam in a formal way. Against the backdrop of a growing intersection of migration and security, a key question emerged: how far could liberal states go in pursuing a comprehensive approach to migration that balanced national security and societal interests with individual protections of justice, freedom, civil liberties, and immigrant integration? This paradox has been most evident at the EU level, where member states are forced to balance national impulses of protectionism with communitarian demands for more cooperation. The employment of migration policy as a tool in counterterrorism has brought many competing pressures and political conflicts to the surface, and it raises several practical questions. What are the effects of counterterrorism on immigration, border control, and policies of exclusion in a Europe of changing boundaries? Has the security-migration link fostered closer cooperation or nationalist protectionism among EU member states? To what degree has the framing of the migration issue as a security issue and migration policy as an instrument in counterterrorism opened up new opportunities for managing migration and overcoming constitutional guarantees and normative constraints (for example, civil liberties and democratic norms)? On balance, what can the comprehensive counterterrorism approach to migration tell us about European norms regarding the migration-security-rights trilemma? This chapter examines the emerging role and implications of immigration policy as a tool of counterterrorism in the European Union. In exploring historical and empirical developments in the EU, the analysis identifies three broad trends related to the emergence and consolidation of a securitydriven migration agenda in a Europe of changing borders. Broadly speaking, the " securitization" of migration, as it is often called, has had the effects of (1) Europeanizing migration policy (institutionalizing, formalizing, and accelerating policy links at the EU level); (2) shifting migration to the foreign policy arena and bolstering the EU as a foreign policy and security actor; and (3) politicizing migration-related issues. In challenging some core democratic values, the security-driven migration agenda has generated a politicization that might otherwise have been absent. To the degree that some cross-national and transatlantic convergence around these practices has emerged, the agenda masks important differences among national political actors. In the final section, I reflect on some cross-national trends in counterterrorism and migration in Europe and the United States to show that despite similar impulses to use migration as a tool in counterterrorism, there are important variations in the constraints and opportunities posed by counterterrorism approaches to migration.