Long-term care and family bargaining

Maxim Engers; Steven Stern

doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00004

Long-term care and family bargaining

Maxim Engers
, Steven Stern

Economics

University of Virginia

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

91 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a structural model of how families decide who should care for elderly parents. We use data from the National Long-Term Care Survey to estimate and test the parameters of the model. Then we use the parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing long-term trends in terms of the common but untested explanations for them. Finally, we simulate the effects of alternative family bargaining rules on individual utility to measure the sensitivity of our results to the family decision-making assumptions we make.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	73-114
Number of pages	42
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	43
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00004
State	Published - 2002

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AB - We present a structural model of how families decide who should care for elderly parents. We use data from the National Long-Term Care Survey to estimate and test the parameters of the model. Then we use the parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing long-term trends in terms of the common but untested explanations for them. Finally, we simulate the effects of alternative family bargaining rules on individual utility to measure the sensitivity of our results to the family decision-making assumptions we make.

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Long-term care and family bargaining

Abstract

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