Morpheus: Bringing the (PKCS) One to Meet the Oracle

Moosa Yahyazadeh; Sze Yiu Chau; Li Li; Man Hong Hue; Joyanta Debnath; Sheung Chiu Ip; Chun Ngai Li; Endadul Hoque; Omar Chowdhury

doi:10.1145/3460120.3485382

Morpheus: Bringing the (PKCS) One to Meet the Oracle

Moosa Yahyazadeh
, Sze Yiu Chau
, Li Li
, Man Hong Hue
, Joyanta Debnath
, Sheung Chiu Ip
, Chun Ngai Li
, Endadul Hoque
, Omar Chowdhury

Computer Science

University of Iowa
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Syracuse University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper focuses on developing an automatic, black-box testing approach called Morpheus to check the non-compliance of libraries implementing PKCS#1-v1.5 signature verification with the PKCS#1-v1.5 standard. Non-compliance can not only make implementations vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style RSA signature forgery attacks but also can induce interoperability issues. For checking non-compliance, Morpheus adaptively generates interesting test cases and then takes advantage of an oracle, a formally proven correct implementation of PKCS#1-v1.5 signature standard, to detect non-compliance in an implementation under test. We have used Morpheus to test 45 implementations of PKCS#1-v1.5 signature verification and discovered that 6 of them are susceptible to variants of the Bleichenbacher-style low public exponent RSA signature forgery attack, 1 implementation has a buffer overflow, 33 implementations have incompatibility issues, and 8 implementations have minor leniencies. Our findings have been responsibly disclosed and positively acknowledged by the developers.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	2474-2496
Number of pages	23
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450384544
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485382
State	Published - Nov 13 2021
Event	27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021 - Virtual, Online, Korea, Republic of Duration: Nov 15 2021 → Nov 19 2021

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)	1543-7221

Conference

Conference	27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021
Country/Territory	Korea, Republic of
City	Virtual, Online
Period	11/15/21 → 11/19/21

Keywords

adaptive combinatorial testing
non-compliance checking
PKCS#1 signature verification
reference implementation

Access to Document

10.1145/3460120.3485382

Cite this

Yahyazadeh, M., Chau, S. Y., Li, L., Hue, M. H., Debnath, J., Ip, S. C., Li, C. N., Hoque, E., & Chowdhury, O. (2021). Morpheus: Bringing the (PKCS) One to Meet the Oracle. In CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 2474-2496). (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485382

@inproceedings{bff58f0e32e941678cf5f89c49a3d9ab,

title = "Morpheus: Bringing the (PKCS) One to Meet the Oracle",

abstract = "This paper focuses on developing an automatic, black-box testing approach called Morpheus to check the non-compliance of libraries implementing PKCS\#1-v1.5 signature verification with the PKCS\#1-v1.5 standard. Non-compliance can not only make implementations vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style RSA signature forgery attacks but also can induce interoperability issues. For checking non-compliance, Morpheus adaptively generates interesting test cases and then takes advantage of an oracle, a formally proven correct implementation of PKCS\#1-v1.5 signature standard, to detect non-compliance in an implementation under test. We have used Morpheus to test 45 implementations of PKCS\#1-v1.5 signature verification and discovered that 6 of them are susceptible to variants of the Bleichenbacher-style low public exponent RSA signature forgery attack, 1 implementation has a buffer overflow, 33 implementations have incompatibility issues, and 8 implementations have minor leniencies. Our findings have been responsibly disclosed and positively acknowledged by the developers.",

keywords = "adaptive combinatorial testing, non-compliance checking, PKCS\#1 signature verification, reference implementation",

author = "Moosa Yahyazadeh and Chau, \{Sze Yiu\} and Li Li and Hue, \{Man Hong\} and Joyanta Debnath and Ip, \{Sheung Chiu\} and Li, \{Chun Ngai\} and Endadul Hoque and Omar Chowdhury",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Owner/Author.; 27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021 ; Conference date: 15-11-2021 Through 19-11-2021",

year = "2021",

month = nov,

day = "13",

doi = "10.1145/3460120.3485382",

language = "English",

series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security",

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Yahyazadeh, M, Chau, SY, Li, L, Hue, MH, Debnath, J, Ip, SC, Li, CN, Hoque, E & Chowdhury, O 2021, Morpheus: Bringing the (PKCS) One to Meet the Oracle. in CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 2474-2496, 27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021, Virtual, Online, Korea, Republic of, 11/15/21. https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485382

Morpheus: Bringing the (PKCS) One to Meet the Oracle. / Yahyazadeh, Moosa; Chau, Sze Yiu; Li, Li et al.
CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, 2021. p. 2474-2496 (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AU - Yahyazadeh, Moosa

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AU - Debnath, Joyanta

AU - Ip, Sheung Chiu

AU - Li, Chun Ngai

AU - Hoque, Endadul

AU - Chowdhury, Omar

PY - 2021/11/13

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N2 - This paper focuses on developing an automatic, black-box testing approach called Morpheus to check the non-compliance of libraries implementing PKCS#1-v1.5 signature verification with the PKCS#1-v1.5 standard. Non-compliance can not only make implementations vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style RSA signature forgery attacks but also can induce interoperability issues. For checking non-compliance, Morpheus adaptively generates interesting test cases and then takes advantage of an oracle, a formally proven correct implementation of PKCS#1-v1.5 signature standard, to detect non-compliance in an implementation under test. We have used Morpheus to test 45 implementations of PKCS#1-v1.5 signature verification and discovered that 6 of them are susceptible to variants of the Bleichenbacher-style low public exponent RSA signature forgery attack, 1 implementation has a buffer overflow, 33 implementations have incompatibility issues, and 8 implementations have minor leniencies. Our findings have been responsibly disclosed and positively acknowledged by the developers.

AB - This paper focuses on developing an automatic, black-box testing approach called Morpheus to check the non-compliance of libraries implementing PKCS#1-v1.5 signature verification with the PKCS#1-v1.5 standard. Non-compliance can not only make implementations vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style RSA signature forgery attacks but also can induce interoperability issues. For checking non-compliance, Morpheus adaptively generates interesting test cases and then takes advantage of an oracle, a formally proven correct implementation of PKCS#1-v1.5 signature standard, to detect non-compliance in an implementation under test. We have used Morpheus to test 45 implementations of PKCS#1-v1.5 signature verification and discovered that 6 of them are susceptible to variants of the Bleichenbacher-style low public exponent RSA signature forgery attack, 1 implementation has a buffer overflow, 33 implementations have incompatibility issues, and 8 implementations have minor leniencies. Our findings have been responsibly disclosed and positively acknowledged by the developers.

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BT - CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

PB - Association for Computing Machinery

Y2 - 15 November 2021 through 19 November 2021

ER -

Yahyazadeh M, Chau SY, Li L, Hue MH, Debnath J, Ip SC et al. Morpheus: Bringing the (PKCS) One to Meet the Oracle. In CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery. 2021. p. 2474-2496. (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security). doi: 10.1145/3460120.3485382

Morpheus: Bringing the (PKCS) One to Meet the Oracle

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Keywords

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