TY - GEN
T1 - Neural Simplex Architecture
AU - Phan, Dung T.
AU - Grosu, Radu
AU - Jansen, Nils
AU - Paoletti, Nicola
AU - Smolka, Scott A.
AU - Stoller, Scott D.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - We present the Neural Simplex Architecture (NSA), a new approach to runtime assurance that provides safety guarantees for neural controllers (obtained e.g. using reinforcement learning) of autonomous and other complex systems without unduly sacrificing performance. NSA is inspired by the Simplex control architecture of Sha et al., but with some significant differences. In the traditional approach, the advanced controller (AC) is treated as a black box; when the decision module switches control to the baseline controller (BC), the BC remains in control forever. There is relatively little work on switching control back to the AC, and there are no techniques for correcting the AC’s behavior after it generates a potentially unsafe control input that causes a failover to the BC. Our NSA addresses both of these limitations. NSA not only provides safety assurances in the presence of a possibly unsafe neural controller, but can also improve the safety of such a controller in an online setting via retraining, without overly degrading its performance. To demonstrate NSA’s benefits, we have conducted several significant case studies in the continuous control domain. These include a target-seeking ground rover navigating an obstacle field, and a neural controller for an artificial pancreas system.
AB - We present the Neural Simplex Architecture (NSA), a new approach to runtime assurance that provides safety guarantees for neural controllers (obtained e.g. using reinforcement learning) of autonomous and other complex systems without unduly sacrificing performance. NSA is inspired by the Simplex control architecture of Sha et al., but with some significant differences. In the traditional approach, the advanced controller (AC) is treated as a black box; when the decision module switches control to the baseline controller (BC), the BC remains in control forever. There is relatively little work on switching control back to the AC, and there are no techniques for correcting the AC’s behavior after it generates a potentially unsafe control input that causes a failover to the BC. Our NSA addresses both of these limitations. NSA not only provides safety assurances in the presence of a possibly unsafe neural controller, but can also improve the safety of such a controller in an online setting via retraining, without overly degrading its performance. To demonstrate NSA’s benefits, we have conducted several significant case studies in the continuous control domain. These include a target-seeking ground rover navigating an obstacle field, and a neural controller for an artificial pancreas system.
KW - Online retraining
KW - Reverse switching
KW - Runtime assurance
KW - Safe reinforcement learning
KW - Simplex architecture
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85089719044
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-55754-6_6
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-55754-6_6
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85089719044
SN - 9783030557539
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 97
EP - 114
BT - NASA Formal Methods - 12th International Symposium, NFM 2020, Proceedings
A2 - Lee, Ritchie
A2 - Jha, Susmit
A2 - Mavridou, Anastasia
PB - Springer
T2 - 12th International Symposium on NASA Formal Methods, NFM 2020
Y2 - 11 May 2020 through 15 May 2020
ER -