Resilient Decentralized Control of Power Buffers in DC Microgrids

This letter investigates resilient decentralized control of power buffers within active loads in a DC microgrid subject to false data injection (FDI) attacks. The attack signals are imposed on local controllers and are assumed to be time-varying and bounded. For each power buffer, a resilient decentralized controller is proposed based on its local information. Differently from the conventional decentralized controller, the proposed resilient decentralized controller incorporates an additional nonlinear feedback term. This nonlinear feedback term is constructed by using the boundary layer method and the adaptive control technique such that the effect of the associated attack signal is suppressed without requiring the knowledge of its upper bound. It is shown that the states of the resulting closed-loop system are uniformly ultimately bounded. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed controller enhances resilience against FDI attacks when compared to the conventional decentralized controller.