TY - GEN
T1 - Short Paper - Taming the Shape Shifter
T2 - 17th International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, DIMVA 2020
AU - Amin Azad, Babak
AU - Starov, Oleksii
AU - Laperdrix, Pierre
AU - Nikiforakis, Nick
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - When it comes to leaked credentials and credit card information, we observe the development and use of anti-fingerprinting browsers by malicious actors. These tools are carefully designed to evade detection, often by mimicking the browsing environment of the victim whose credentials were stolen. Even though these tools are popular in the underground markets, they have not received enough attention by researchers. In this paper, we report on the first evaluation of four underground, commercial, and research anti-fingerprinting browsers and highlight their high success rate in bypassing browser fingerprinting. Despite their success against well-known fingerprinting methods and libraries, we show that even slightest variation in the simulated fingerprint compared to the real ones can give away the presence of anti-fingerprinting tools. As a result, we provide techniques and fingerprint-based signatures that can be used to detect the current generation of anti-fingerprinting browsers.
AB - When it comes to leaked credentials and credit card information, we observe the development and use of anti-fingerprinting browsers by malicious actors. These tools are carefully designed to evade detection, often by mimicking the browsing environment of the victim whose credentials were stolen. Even though these tools are popular in the underground markets, they have not received enough attention by researchers. In this paper, we report on the first evaluation of four underground, commercial, and research anti-fingerprinting browsers and highlight their high success rate in bypassing browser fingerprinting. Despite their success against well-known fingerprinting methods and libraries, we show that even slightest variation in the simulated fingerprint compared to the real ones can give away the presence of anti-fingerprinting tools. As a result, we provide techniques and fingerprint-based signatures that can be used to detect the current generation of anti-fingerprinting browsers.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85088497371
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-52683-2_8
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-52683-2_8
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85088497371
SN - 9783030526825
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 160
EP - 170
BT - Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment - 17th International Conference, DIMVA 2020, Proceedings
A2 - Maurice, Clémentine
A2 - Bilge, Leyla
A2 - Stringhini, Gianluca
A2 - Neves, Nuno
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Y2 - 24 June 2020 through 26 June 2020
ER -