TY - GEN
T1 - The Power to Never Be Wrong
T2 - 32nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2025
AU - Kirchner, Robin
AU - Tsoukaladelis, Chris
AU - Johns, Martin
AU - Nikiforakis, Nick
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
PY - 2025/11/22
Y1 - 2025/11/22
N2 - The Web is subject to link rot, where links break as webpages are updated or deleted. Web archiving services, such as the Wayback Machine, have emerged as a key solution to address link rot by archiving web content and preserving the look and feel of websites over time. These services offer critical functionality to users, serving as a historical baseline for an ever-changing Web. Implicit in everyone's use of these services is that they are capable of providing an accurate record of the past and can, therefore, provide reliable ground truth for comparing the past to the present. In this paper, we demonstrate that this implicit assumption does not necessarily hold. To this end, we propose two new threat models against web archiving services in which attackers can exert control over how their websites are archived. Evasive adversaries can distinguish crawlers operated by web archiving services from regular users, selectively denying or altering the content delivered to the former. Anachronistic adversaries can not only identify archive crawlers but also deliver content that enables them to retain control over archived snapshots. By abusing fundamental access-control mechanisms of the Web, these attackers can effectively alter the past as recorded by web archiving services. We found that all web archives we investigated suffer from one or more of these issues, challenging our current reliance on them.
AB - The Web is subject to link rot, where links break as webpages are updated or deleted. Web archiving services, such as the Wayback Machine, have emerged as a key solution to address link rot by archiving web content and preserving the look and feel of websites over time. These services offer critical functionality to users, serving as a historical baseline for an ever-changing Web. Implicit in everyone's use of these services is that they are capable of providing an accurate record of the past and can, therefore, provide reliable ground truth for comparing the past to the present. In this paper, we demonstrate that this implicit assumption does not necessarily hold. To this end, we propose two new threat models against web archiving services in which attackers can exert control over how their websites are archived. Evasive adversaries can distinguish crawlers operated by web archiving services from regular users, selectively denying or altering the content delivered to the former. Anachronistic adversaries can not only identify archive crawlers but also deliver content that enables them to retain control over archived snapshots. By abusing fundamental access-control mechanisms of the Web, these attackers can effectively alter the past as recorded by web archiving services. We found that all web archives we investigated suffer from one or more of these issues, challenging our current reliance on them.
KW - Archiving
KW - Attacks
KW - Snapshots
KW - Web
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105023848482
U2 - 10.1145/3719027.3765051
DO - 10.1145/3719027.3765051
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105023848482
T3 - CCS 2025 - Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 2982
EP - 2996
BT - CCS 2025 - Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 13 October 2025 through 17 October 2025
ER -